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Abstract 
489 university students in three countries completed questionnaires in a study investigating 
affect and person specificity in the use of mood regulation strategies.  The major aims of the 
study were to (1) describe the relationship between specific affective states and the strategies 
utilised, (2) explore the role that individual differences variables played in the tendency to use 
particular strategies, and (3) measure the impact that the use of different strategies had upon 
subjective well-being.  Results did not consistently reveal a differential use of strategies based 
upon the affective state experienced.  Gender, culture, degree of neuroticism, extraversion, 
self-reflection, and insight were all found to impact to some extent upon the type of strategies 
used.  Higher levels of subjective well-being were linked to the use of cognitive engagement, 
behavioural engagement, and venting and expressing strategies. 
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Affect and Person Specificity in Mood Regulation 
       Mood regulation refers to efforts undertaken to modify or maintain one’s mood 
(Lischetzke & Eid, 2003).  The ability to effectively regulate one’s mood state is considered 
to be “a crucial part of effective and adaptive psychological functioning” (Larsen, 2000, p. 
129).  Indeed, an inability to effectively regulate one’s affective states has specifically been 
linked to the development of mental illness (Bradley, 1990) and psychopathology (van Praag, 
1990).   
       Typically, when individuals self-regulate their moods, they aim to either repair negative 
mood states or to maintain positive ones.  Although less common, there are certain situations 
when the reverse could also be true (see Larsen & Prizmic, 2004, Lischetzke & Eid, 2004).  
The majority of self-regulatory efforts though are generally aimed at the down-regulation of 
negative moods (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice,1994).  Larsen and Prizmic (2004) argue 
that the regulation of negative affect (NA) is more vital to the regulation of moods because 
experiences of NA tend to be two to three times stronger than experiences of positive affect 
(PA).  NA, therefore, is given priority in regulatory efforts. 
       Several models have been proposed to explain the mood regulation process (e.g. Carver 
& Scheier, 1990; Gross, 1999).  Larsen (2000) described a control model of mood regulation 
based on Carver and Scheier’s (1982) cybernetic control model of self-regulation.  In this 
model, Larsen assumes that each individual has a ‘set’ affective state that they find most 
appealing and that they constantly monitor their current mood state to check how it compares 
to their desired state.  If they notice that their current mood state is discrepant from their 
desired mood state, they take active measures to moderate the discrepancy through the use of 
self-regulation strategies.   
       Larsen and Prizmic (2004) have further argued that whilst self-regulatory efforts may be 
focused on the immediate reduction of the discrepancy between current and desired mood 
states, the overarching goal of mood regulation efforts is to maintain satisfactory levels of 
subjective well-being (SWB).  SWB is considered to be the average levels of positive and 
negative affect an individual generally experiences (Deiner & Larsen, 1993) and has, 
therefore, quite a long-term perspective.  According to Larsen and Prizmic, in order to 
regulate SWB, one must regulate, more specifically, one’s experiences of PA and NA.  In 
accordance with Larsen’s (2000) control model of affect regulation outlined above, 
individuals will make use of affect regulation strategies in order to do so. 
       Many studies have been conducted with the aim of developing a complete taxonomy of 
the self-regulation strategies that individuals use to alter their mood states (see Morris & 
                                                                                           Affect and person specificity 5
Reilly, 1987; Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999; Thayer, Newman & McClain, 1994).  Based upon 
his own empirical studies, Larsen (2000) suggested that all mood regulation strategies were 
either behavioural or cognitive in nature, and were directed towards altering either the 
emotion or the situation.  Further to his taxonomic work, Larsen and Prizmic (2004) have 
developed a scale called the Measure of Affect Regulation Styles (MARS).  This instrument 
has been developed to measure the type and the frequency with which individuals make use 
of the various mood regulation strategies to modify or maintain their mood states.  It measures 
the use of strategies to both down-regulate negative affect and strategies to maintain or up-
regulate positive affect.   
 
Negative Affect Regulation Strategies 
       The strategies used to regulate negative affectivity are more numerous than those used to 
regulate positive affectivity.  Again, this may reflect the relative importance of negative mood 
regulation over and above that of positive mood regulation.  Below is a brief description of 
the various strategies used to down-regulate negative affect. 
 
Distraction 
       Distracting oneself from one’s bad mood by engaging in an alternate activity is a 
commonly used strategy to escape a negative mood (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  Such 
distracting activities could include watching television, reading a book, working, etc.  Several 
studies have found it to be an effective strategy to use in order to regulate a negative mood 
(Larsen, 1993, as cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).  Fichman, 
Koestner, Zuroff, and Gordon’s (1999) study also found distraction to be a useful strategy; 
however, they differentiated between active distraction strategies and passive distraction 
strategies.  Active strategies (e.g. reading or working) were found to successfully down-
regulate negative moods whilst passive strategies (e.g. watching television) were not found to 
effectively improve negative mood states (Fichman et. al, 1999).  A study by Thayer and 
colleagues (1994) produced a similar distinction between active and passive distraction 
strategies.   
       Larsen and Prizmic (2004) hold that the reason distraction can be a useful mood 
regulation strategy is that it helps stop individuals from ruminating.  Rumination is defined as 
“the tendency to focus on one’s symptoms of distress, and think about the causes and 
consequences of these symptoms in a passive and repetitive manner” (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Corte, 2004, p. 411).  As rumination has been shown to prolong episodes of anxiety and 
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sadness (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003), to be ineffective in the down-regulation of negative moods 
(Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990), and to predict the development of depression (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema & Larson, 1999), distraction can be a useful tool to break 
such ruminative cycles.  Given the findings of Fichman et al. (1999) and Thayer et al. (1994), 
however, it is clearly preferable to utilise strategies that require active participation on the part 
of the individual rather than passive strategies. 
 
Venting or Expressing 
       Venting or expressing one’s negative emotions and feelings in order to confront and 
move beyond those feelings is a commonly used affect regulation strategy (Larsen & Prizmic, 
2004).  Baumeister et al. (1994) state that while it is a commonly held view that venting one’s 
feelings is vital in order to decrease the pressure of an emotion or mood (catharsis), studies 
have shown that expressing negative affect is not always conducive to the down-regulation of 
negative moods and is, hence, a strategy that is frequently misused.  Both Larsen (1993, as 
cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 2004) and Totterdell and Parkinson (1999) reported that venting 
was an ineffective strategy to use in the down-regulation of negative affect whilst Fichman 
and colleagues (1999) found in their study that venting prolonged negative mood states.  In 
the case of anger, researchers have consistently found that venting results in the prolongation 
of the angry mood (Gondolf, 1985) or in the up-regulation of the negative affect in the form 
of aggression (Straus, Gelles, & Steinmetz, 1980).  Larsen (1993, as cited in Prizmic & 
Larsen, 2004) reported that expressions of sadness were often associated with increased levels 
of sadness.  Other researchers have shown that emotions are made stronger, not weaker 
through their expression (emotion expressivity effect) (see Baumeister et al., 1994, for a 
review of the research).  Given the findings discussed above, it appears unlikely that 
expressing negative affect is an effective strategy to use for the down-regulation of negative 
moods. 
 
Cognitive Reappraisal 
       In order to down-regulate negative moods, individuals often try to reinterpret the situation 
that is causing their mood in order to view it in a more positive light (Larsen & Prizmic, 
2004).  The old saying ‘looking on the bright side’ describes this strategy quite adequately.  
By refocusing one’s attention on the positive aspects of a situation and deemphasising the 
negative, one can alleviate a negative mood.  Several studies have found cognitive reappraisal 
to be an effective mood regulation strategy (Larsen, 1993, as cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 2004; 
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Totterdell & Parkinson, 1999).  Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, and Larson (1998) have reported 
that there are also long-term benefits to being able to find something positive in a 
predominantly negative situation.  In their study, they found that following the death of a 
loved one, those individuals who were able to find something positive in the sorrowful 
experience were not as unhappy six months later as those who could not. 
 
Suppression 
       The suppression of negative affect is a negative mood regulation strategy whereby 
individuals avoid expressing their negative moods in order to alleviate them (Larsen & 
Prizmic, 2004).  Whilst suppression can effectively stop one from experiencing negative 
feelings such as disappointment and anger (Gross, 1998), the effects of using such a strategy 
may not be so positive when used over longer periods of time.  For example, Gross and John 
(2003) reported that the suppression of emotional expression was related to lower levels of 
well-being and interpersonal functioning.   
 
Downward Social Comparison 
       A perhaps less widely utilised strategy, downward social comparison involves attempting 
to improve negative mood states by comparing oneself to others who have experienced 
something worse (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  In doing so, individuals can feel that, in relation 
to these certain others, their situation is relatively tolerable.  Research has shown, however, 
that for this strategy to be effective individuals need to compare themselves to others who are 
similar to themselves and who are equally vulnerable to the same outcomes (Lockwood, 
2002). 
 
Taking Action or Making Plans 
       In an effort to alleviate their negative mood states, some individuals take action to solve 
the problem causing their mood (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  Termed ‘problem-focused coping’ 
in the coping literature, this strategy has been shown to be an effective strategy in the 
reduction of stress, especially when compared to the alternative ‘emotion-focused coping’ 
(Lazarus, 1966).  In addition, it has been reported that making plans to avoid similar problems 
in the future (when taking action would not alter an outcome) is also an effective and 
frequently used strategy to improve negative moods (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004). 
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Pleasant Activities and Self-Reward 
       Individuals often reward themselves by engaging in pleasant activities that make them 
feel good or by treating themselves to something they may desire when attempting to down-
regulate a negative mood (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  Fichman and colleagues (1999) found 
that rewarding oneself with pleasant activities was a very effective negative mood regulation 
strategy, while Faber and Vohs (2004) argue that self-gifting (or buying gifts for oneself) can 
effectively decrease NA or increase PA.  
 
Exercising 
       Exercising is a well-established mood regulation strategy (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004). 
Steptoe, Kimball and Basford (1998) found that women reported less negative moods and 
more positive moods on the days that they had exercised, whilst Arent, Landers and Etnier 
(2000) reported in their meta-analysis of 32 studies that exercising was associated with lower 
levels of negative moods and higher levels of positive moods in elderly people.  A recent 
study by Giacobbi, Hausenblas, and Frye (2005) also found that exercising was associated 
with the reduction up-regulation of positive moods and the down-regulation of negative 
moods, although the relationship between exercise and negative mood reduction was not 
significant when daily life events were controlled for.  Watson (2000), however, disagrees and 
holds that the evidence for an association between the exercise and mood improvement is 
mixed in non-clinical populations.  Nevertheless, it is a frequently used mood regulation 
strategy.  A study conducted by Thayer and colleagues (1994), revealed that participants 
believed exercise to be the best way to improve negative mood states.   
 
Consumptive Behaviours 
       Some individuals attempt to improve their negative moods by eating food, whilst others 
use stimulants such as caffeine or nicotine.  Still others may drink alcohol or even ingest 
drugs to escape their negative moods (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  Whilst the majority of these 
behaviours may have a short-term effect as they either distract individuals from their negative 
moods temporarily or satisfy a craving, the long-term effects of using such strategies to 
regulate one’s mood are unlikely to be beneficial.  Studies by Fichman and colleagues (1999) 
and Larsen (1993) found that passive distraction strategies such as eating were not useful in 
the down-regulation of negative affect.  Indeed, an over reliance on either food, alcohol, 
cigarettes, or narcotics to improve mood states will, in all probability, only have negative 
consequences for the health of an individual. 
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Socialising 
       A very common strategy implemented to down-regulate negative affect is to spend time 
with others (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  The participants in Thayer and colleague’s (1994) 
study reported that social interaction was an effective strategy to use in the down-regulation 
of negative affect.  Tice and Baumeister (1993) clarify, however, that it is important when one 
socialises to improve a negative mood state that one does not choose to be with others who 
are also experiencing negative moods.  Larsen and Prizmic suggest that socialising is a useful 
technique for several reasons.  The activity is a form of distraction in itself (typically a 
positive one) and thus helps to avoid ruminative tendencies.  Alternatively, this strategy 
allows individuals the chance to share their feelings with others, which, in turn, provides 
opportunities for them to alter the way they are thinking about their problem through 
engaging in the cognitive reappraisal process.  
 
Withdrawal 
       Withdrawal involves being alone and avoiding contact with others whilst one is 
experiencing a negative mood state (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  Although this has been shown 
to be a commonly used strategy (Larsen, 1993, as cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 2004; Morris & 
Reilly, 1987; Parkinson et al., 1996), Larsen and Fichman et al. (1999) found that withdrawal 
did not alleviate negative mood states.  Thayer and colleagues (1994) also found avoidance to 
be a less than effective strategy to use in the down-regulation of negative affect.  Larsen and 
Prizmic do acknowledge that withdrawal is likely to be an appropriate strategy to use when 
experiencing angry moods, however it will be an ineffective strategy to use when 
experiencing other negative states (e.g. loneliness, worry, sadness). 
 
Positive Affect Regulation Strategies 
       Although there are substantially fewer strategies used to regulate positive affect, an  
unpublished study by Prizmic (1997, as cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 2004) revealed that 91% 
of respondents indicated that they had consciously used regulation strategies in order to  
provoke a good mood or to maintain a positive affective state.  Clearly, these strategies are  
also very important to mood regulatory efforts and are outlined below. 
 
Positive Focus 
       As opposed to cognitive reappraisal (which, as previously discussed, involves 
reinterpreting the way one views negative events or situations causing bad moods), 
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maintaining a positive focus requires one to focus on the positive aspects in one’s life (Larsen 
& Prizmic, 2004).  Here the saying ‘to count one’s blessings’ is an apt descriptor.  Emmons 
and McCullough (2003) randomly assigned participants to complete daily lists of either 
complaints, things that they were grateful for, or neutral things for either 3 or 10 weeks.  They 
found that across the majority of well-being measures, those individuals who had kept lists of 
things they were thankful for had higher levels of well-being.  Feeling gratitude and 
maintaining a positive focus appear, therefore, to be important tools for the up-regulation of 
positive affect. 
 
Helping and Performing Other Acts of Kindness 
       Performing altruistic behaviours is another mood regulation strategy that can be used to 
increase feelings of PA (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  There have been few studies, however, 
that have directly addressed whether helping is associated with increases in PA.  Salovey, 
Mayer, and Rosenhan (1991) argue that it is inevitable that helping would promote positive 
moods.  Indirect evidence for the usefulness of helping as an affective regulation strategy has 
been found.  For example, in Lucas’ unpublished study (2000, as cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 
2004), it was found that the frequency of helping behaviour was positively correlated with 
subjective well-being.  Performing altruistic behaviours, therefore, appears to have both short 
and long-term benefits. 
 
Expressing Positive Feelings 
       Laughing, smiling and using humour are strategies that can be used in the maintenance or 
up-regulation of positive affect (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  As previously stated, researchers 
have claimed that mood can be controlled through actual emotional expression or the 
emotional expressivity effect (see Baumeister et al., 1994, for a review of the research).  
Duclos and Laird (2001) argue, therefore, that expressions of positive affect could increase or 
maintain positive mood states.  Studies on the topic have tended to focus on the use of 
humour and its relationship to coping with stress, and these have shown a positive 
relationship between the use of humour and one’s ability to deal effectively with stress 
(Bonanno & Keltner, 1997; Kuiper & Martin, 1998).  In addition, Lefcourt (2002) presented 
data that suggested that people with a sense of humour often had good immune systems and 
were able to recover from illness more quickly than those without a sense of humour.   
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Affect and Person Specificity in Mood Regulation 
       The aim of the present study is to further our understanding of mood regulation through 
the focus on affect specificity and person specificity in strategy usage.  Affect specificity, is 
concerned with the identification of possible mood-related differences in the choice of 
strategies; that is, can we expect that individuals will show a tendency to choose different 
strategies depending on the particular mood state they are experiencing?  This study will 
attempt to shed light on this issue by exploring which strategies individuals report using most 
frequently when feeling bored, lonely, worried, anxious, sad, and angry.   To the best 
knowledge of the author, there has not been any research conducted with this specific focus 
before, and, therefore, this research is purely exploratory.  It is hypothesised, however, that 
the mood regulation strategies identified as most commonly used will vary according to the 
specific mood state experienced by the individual.   
       Person specificity, alternatively, is concerned with the identification of the individual 
difference variables that affect the use of the various mood regulation strategies.  Below, 
some of these potential individual difference variables are discussed. 
 
Gender 
       Studies of clinical populations have shown that women are more likely to experience 
depression that men.  Indeed, Nolen-Hoeksema (1990) found that in their sample, women 
were twice as likely as men to become depressed.  This finding is rather contradictory to 
studies conducted in non-clinical populations that have found that men and women do not 
differ significantly in terms of well-being and happiness (see Watson, 2000, for a review).   
For example, Michalos (1991) conducted a large study of citizens from 39 countries around 
the world and found that women and men reported very similar levels of well-being and 
happiness.  If it is concluded then that men and women in the non-clinical population 
experience more or less equivalent levels of PA and NA, can it be assumed that men and 
women use similar strategies to regulate their moods?  The research discussed below suggests 
that this may not be the case.   
       Raver’s (1996) study of self-regulatory abilities in toddlers found that boys and girls used 
divergent activities to regulate affect.  Raver found that boys used distraction most frequently 
whilst girls were more likely to prefer to be consoled by their mothers.  Thayer et al. (1994) 
found clear gender differences in the use of mood regulation strategies by adults.  In their 
study, women were found to use what they termed “passive mood management strategies” (p. 
922).  This broad category included watching TV, eating, sleeping, and drinking caffeine.  A 
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second broad category of strategy commonly endorsed by females was that of “social support, 
ventilation, and gratification” (p. 922) which included strategies such as talking with others, 
eating, smoking, and engaging in an emotional activity.  Men, alternatively, more frequently 
endorsed the use of distraction and seeking out pleasant activities to alter their mood states.  
In addition, the use of alcohol and drugs was a strategy more commonly selected by males.   
       Other evidence of gender-based differences in the use of mood regulation strategies 
comes from specific studies on eating, alcohol usage, and on rumination.  For example, Tice 
and Baumeister (1993) found that women were more likely to eat food in order to alleviate 
sad mood states than men.  With regards to alcohol use, male social drinkers have been found 
to make greater use of alcohol in order to regulate negative moods than female social 
drinkers.  Interestingly, the reverse pattern seems to hold true amongst those who have been 
diagnosed with Alcohol Use Disorder (AUD); that is women who have been diagnosed with 
AUD use alcohol to regulate their moods more than men diagnosed with a similar diagnosis 
(see Nolen-Hoeksema & Corte (2004)  for a review of relevant literature on gender 
differences in alcohol usage).  When ruminative tendencies are considered, women show a 
proneness to ruminate more than men.  In a study by Butler and Nolen-Hoeksema (1994), 
women who had been induced into a sad mood were more likely than men in an induced-sad 
mood to choose to focus on their negative feelings than to engage in an alternative, distracting 
task.  Surprisingly, the result also held when a neutral mood was induced.  The research 
suggests, therefore, that men and women do make differential use of mood regulation 
strategies.  The current study will extend the previous findings by providing a current 
assessment of the most frequently endorsed strategies amongst men and women.   
 
Culture 
       An additional variable of interest in this study of person specificity in mood regulation is 
that of culture.  Do the strategies most frequently utilised by people in the various parts of the 
world differ?  And if so, can we posit that these differences arise as a result of socialisation 
practices and cultural norms?  Some theorists (e.g. Larsen & Prizmic, 2004) have 
hypothesised the possibility of an individualistic versus a collectivist cultural distinction in the 
use of strategies.  In fact, a cross-cultural study of strategy use, with a particular focus on 
consumptive behaviours, found that individualistic cultures use more consumptive strategies 
and choose strategies that have a greater emotional impact on the individual (as opposed to 
the group) than collectivist cultures (Luomala, Kumar, Worm, & Singh, 2004). 
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       In this study, we are interested in an intra-individualistic cultural comparison: Americans 
versus Norwegians versus Australians.  Can we reasonably expect to find that individuals in 
the United States of America will show differing patterns of mood regulation strategy usage 
when compared to individuals from Norway and Australia?  Although there is clearly a lack 
of research evidence, this expectation is still considered reasonable.  Whilst each of these 
countries scores high on Individualism scales (Hofstede, 1991), each also has different sets of 
cultural norms and values which could potentially have an effect on the way individuals 
regulate their moods.  On this basis, it is hypothesised that differences will emerge in the 
typical responses endorsed in the different countries in this study.  
 
Extraversion and Neuroticism 
       Of the Big 5 personality traits (Costa & McCrae, 1992), two have been consistently 
identified as important predictors of mood and emotionality: neuroticism and extraversion.  
Individuals high in neuroticism tend to feel anxious, sad, shameful, unfriendly, and guilty, 
whilst those high in extraversion, conversely, tend to be sociable, assertive, positive, lively, 
and friendly (Watson, 2000).  Given these tendencies, it is not surprising that many studies 
have found a strong association between neuroticism and NA and extraversion and PA; that 
is, individuals who score high on neuroticism scales tend to exhibit high levels of NA, and 
individuals who score high on extraversion scales tend to exhibit high levels of PA (see 
Watson, 2000, p.180-2, for a review of the research).  Furthermore, these studies have shown 
that NA and PA are not opposite ends of a single dimension, but two separate and 
uncorrelated dimensions.  Scores on one dimension do not, therefore, impact the scores on the 
other.   
       Based on this research, it is concluded that neuroticism and extraversion differentially 
impact upon the affective lives of individuals.  This study will extend current research and 
hypothesise that these personality traits have a direct effect, not only on the experience of 
specific mood states, but also on the choice of strategies chosen to regulate those mood states.  
The specific nature of these differences can only be speculated, although Larsen and Prizmic 
(2004) have suggested that extraverts could possibly make greater use of strategies such as 
socialising or helping, whilst neurotics may be more likely to use ineffective strategies.  
Clearly, one major aim of this study is to identify what, if any, effect these personality traits 
have upon strategy choice. 
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Private Self-Consciousness 
       Private self-consciousness (PSC) is yet another individual differences variable that may 
have an effect on mood regulation.  Lischetzke and Eid (2003), who define PSC as 
“dispositional self-focused attention to one’s inner self” (p. 361), highlight the importance of 
PSC to the self-regulatory process.  Consider the control model of affect regulation proposed 
by Larsen (2000).  As previously mentioned, in this model individuals need to compare their 
current affective state with their desired affective state in order to ascertain whether it is 
necessary to take action to modify their mood.  Clearly, one must have an awareness of one’s 
current mood state in order to make this comparison and this awareness comes through 
attention.   
       Many studies have been conducted to ascertain whether heightened levels of PSC are, in 
fact, generally related to positive outcomes.  The findings, however, have been quite 
contradictory.  For example, some studies have found that PSC is associated with such 
positive outcomes as greater self-knowledge (Mullen & Suls, 1982) and more successful self-
regulation (Suls & Fletcher, 1985) whilst others have indicated that PSC is related to negative 
outcomes such as depression and negative affect (Ingram, 1990).  Grant, Franklin, and 
Langford (2002) separate what has been commonly called PSC in the literature into two sub-
components: self-reflection, or “the inspection and evaluation of one’s thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviour” (p. 821) and insight or “the clarity of understanding of one’s thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviour” (p. 821).  In their study, they found that insight was negatively correlated with 
depression, anxiety, stress, and alexithymia, and positively correlated with self-regulation and 
cognitive flexibility whilst self-reflection was positively correlated with anxiety and stress 
(but not depression and alexithymia).  Based on the findings of Grant and colleagues, it 
appears that having a clear understanding of one’s affective states (insight) will lead to more 
positive outcomes than merely having an awareness of the experience of one’s varying 
affective states (self-reflection).   
       In this study, PSC will be measured as a variable that may potentially impact upon the 
choice and frequency of strategy use in mood regulation.  To the author’s knowledge, there 
have been no studies that have specifically looked at the relationship between PSC and the 
strategies used to regulate mood states.  Based on the research of Grant and colleagues (2002) 
linking insight to positive outcomes, it is hypothesised that those high in insight will make the 
greatest use of the more effective mood regulation strategies, such as cognitive reappraisal, 
making plans and taking action, and that those low in insight may make greater use of 
ineffective strategies, such as rumination or venting.  These hypotheses are broadly based on 
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the reasoning that those high in insight have a clear understanding of their own affective 
states, and should, therefore, utilise more effective strategies in order to regulate their mood 
states than those low in insight who lack this understanding.  In accordance with prior 
research on the relationship between self-reflection and negative outcomes (Grant et al., 
2002), it is further hypothesised that self-reflection will be associated with the use of 
ineffective strategies such as rumination and withdrawal. 
 
Subjective Well-Being 
       In addition to this study’s focus on the choice and frequency of strategy usage in mood 
regulation, another question will be addressed: Are there any long-term effects associated 
with the use of mood regulation strategies on one’s affective well-being?  Several previous 
studies have attempted to uncover which affect regulation strategies are most effective for 
improving mood states (e.g. Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999; Prizmic 2000 as cited in Larsen & 
Prizmic, 2004), however, these have tended to focus on the immediate effectiveness of the 
strategies employed.  For example, in Prizmic’s daily experience study, participants recorded 
their mood and use of strategies on several occasions during the course of the day for several 
weeks at a time.  The researchers later computed whether the participant’s mood following the 
use of a strategy was better than it would have been by chance.  Another strategy used to 
gauge effectiveness has been to ask the participants themselves to recollect how effective the 
strategy is at improving their mood states (Thayer et al., 1994).   
       While such research has certainly been useful for gaining insight into the short-term 
effectiveness of the various affect regulation strategies, we are not able to see any of the 
potentially long term effects through such studies.  For example, while it has been established 
that there are some strategies that will stop one temporarily from experiencing a negative 
mood (e.g. suppression of unwanted thoughts), the effects may not be so positive when those 
same strategies are used over longer periods of time (Labott et al, 1990).   Daily experience 
studies, therefore, do not reveal anything of the long-term relationship between the choice and 
frequency of strategy use and an individual’s affective well-being at the most general level 
and, for this reason, it is suggested that a broader perspective needs to be adopted.   
       To address this imbalance in the literature, this study will explore the relationship 
between the use of different mood regulation strategies and subjective well-being.  As 
discussed, subjective well-being is the average of the levels of positive and negative affect 
that an individual experiences, and is considered to be the over-arching goal of mood 
regulatory efforts (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  Because people must regulate their experiences 
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of positive and negative affect in order to regulate their feelings of subjective well being, and 
they tend to make use of affect regulation strategies in order to do so, it makes intuitive sense 
to study these variables in combination.   
 
Measure of Affect Regulation Styles (MARS) 
       As already mentioned, the MARS was developed by Larsen and Prizmic (2004) to 
measure how frequently an individual reports using the various mood regulation strategies in 
order to either down-regulate a negative mood or to maintain a positive mood.  Larsen and 
Prizmic have found that the 34 items of the MARS form seven indices: active distraction, 
cognitive engagement, behavioral engagement, venting and expressing affect, passive 
distraction and acceptance, rumination and withdrawal, and waiting and reframing. 
       The active distraction index contains the following strategies: (i) I socialize, (ii) I do 
something fun, something I really enjoy, (iii) I watch TV, read a book, listen to music, (iv) I 
use alcohol, (v) I laugh, joke around, try to make myself or others laugh, (vi) I treat myself to 
something special, (vii) I play sports, exercise, and (viii) I think about something to distract 
myself from my feelings.  The strategies subsumed by this index (with the exception of ‘I use 
alcohol’) have been frequently found to be effective mood regulators (Faber & Vohs, 2004; 
Fichman, et al., 1999; Giacobbi, et al., 2005; Larsen, 1993, as cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 
2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Thayer et al., 1994).  It is, therefore, presumed that higher 
mean scores on this index will be associated with higher scores on the positive well-being 
measures. 
       The strategies that form the cognitive engagement index of the MARS are: (i) I try to 
think about those things that are going well for me, (ii) I try to be grateful for the things in my 
life that are going well, (iii) I try to put things into perspective, (iv) I try to find something 
good in the situation, and (v) I compare myself to people who are worse off.  Again, because 
prior research (Larsen, 1993, as cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 2004; Thayer et al., 1994; 
Totterdell & Parkinson, 1999) has found that these are generally effective strategies to use in 
order to regulate one’s mood, it is presumed that higher scores on this index will also be 
positively associated with well-being outcomes. 
       Likewise, because previous studies have linked the strategies subsumed by the 
behavioural engagement index with improvements in mood (e.g. Fichman et al., 1999; 
Larsen, 1993, as cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 2004; Lucas, 2000, as cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 
2004), frequent use of these strategies should also be linked to positive well-being outcomes.  
The strategies reflected in this index are: (i) I make plans or resolution to avoid such problems 
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in future, (ii) I work on something or stay busy, (iii) I take action to solve the problem, and 
(iv) I go out of my way to help someone. 
       Conversely, it is expected that negative well-being outcomes will be associated with a 
tendency to use the strategies subsumed by the passive distraction and acceptance index.  
This index reflects the following strategies: (i) I pray, put my faith in God, or do something 
religious, (ii) I try to accept it as my fate, what will be will be, (iii) I drink coffee or 
caffeinated beverages, and (iv) I eat something. Most of these strategies have been routinely 
found in research to be ineffective as mood regulators (Fichman et al., 1999; Larsen, 1993, as 
cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 2004; Thayer, et al., 1994).  Similarly, the rumination and 
withdrawal index subsumes strategies that have frequently been found by researchers to 
prolong or increase negative moods (Fichman, et al.,1999; Larsen, 1993, as cited in Larsen & 
Prizmic, 2004; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990) and, therefore, higher scores on this index 
are expected to be associated with negative well-being outcomes.  The specific strategies 
subsumed by this index are: (i) I write about my feeling in diary, (ii) I withdraw from or avoid 
the situation, (iii) I sleep or take a nap, and (iv) I try to understand my feelings by thinking 
and analyzing them.   
       The waiting and reframing index contains only two strategies: (i) I try to reinterpret the 
situation, to find different meaning, and (ii) I daydream of the time when I will not have this 
problem.  It is difficult to predict whether the scores on this index will have any bearing on 
well-being outcomes as the first strategy appears to be a strategy that could be effective in 
regulating a negative mood, whilst the second appears to be relatively passive and would, 
therefore, be unlikely to be an effective mood regulator.   
       Finally, given the weight of the arguments presented in the literature against the venting 
of negative affect (Fichman et al, 1999; Larsen,1993; Totterdell & Parkinson,1999), it is 
hypothesized that higher scores on this index will be associated with lower levels of well-
being.  The strategies reflected in this index include: (i) I let my feelings out by expressing 
them, (ii) I try to not let my feeling show, to suppress any expression. (reversed item), (iii) I 
talk to someone or my friend about my feelings, (iv) I keep for myself, I want to be alone. 
(reversed item), and (v) I talk to an advisor/mentor or older person who could give me advice.   
 
Unique contribution of present study - hypotheses 
       Prior research conducted in the field of mood regulation and, more specifically, on mood 
regulation strategies has focused predominantly on (1) the development of a complete 
taxonomy of the various strategies individuals use in order to regulate their mood (Morris & 
                                                                                           Affect and person specificity 18
Reilly, 1987; Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999; Thayer, et al., 1994), (2) the development of 
models to describe the processes involved in affect regulation (e.g. Carver & Scheier, 1990; 
Gross, 1999; Larsen, 2000), and (3) the identification of the strategies which appear to most 
effectively improve mood states (Larsen, 1993, as cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 2004; Parkinson 
& Totterdell, 1999; Prizmic, 2000 as cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 2004; Thayer, et al., 1994).  
The present study, alternatively, is concerned principally with the issues of affect and person 
specificity in the use of mood regulation strategies, and the relationship between strategy 
usage and subjective well-being.  Although there is a degree of overlap between previous 
research and this study, the author knows of no other study that has specifically explored the 
role of affect specificity in either strategy usage or the relationship between such a multitude 
of individual differences variables and the use of mood regulation strategies.    
       This study will specifically extend the previous findings on gender differences in strategy 
usage by providing a current assessment of the most frequently endorsed strategies amongst 
men and women.  It will investigate intra-individualistic cultural distinctions in strategy use, 
and will extend current research on mood and personality by proposing personality-based 
differences in the choice of strategies chosen to regulate mood states.  Additionally, this study 
will explore the relationship between private self-consciousness and the strategies used to 
regulate mood states, something that has not previously been addressed in research.  
Furthermore, the emphasis placed here upon SWB as an outcome variable of strategy usage 
separates this study from prior research that has focused predominantly on the short-term 
effectiveness of the various affect regulation strategies.  Figure 1 clearly illustrates the 
variables under investigation in the present study of person specificity in affect regulation.   
       The present study makes a number of hypotheses regarding these issues that are 
summarised below: 
1. Individuals will differentially use mood regulation strategies depending upon the 
mood state they are experiencing; for example, individuals will use a different strategy 
to regulate their angry moods than they will use to regulate their sad moods etc. 
2. Men and women will differentially use mood regulation strategies.  It is expected that 
men will make greater use of distraction strategies such as exercise and alcohol 
consumption than women in order to regulate their moods, whilst women will be more 
inclined than men to socialise, vent, and to eat in order to alter their mood states.   
3. Americans, Norwegians, and Australians will report different patterns of strategy 
choice and frequency of usage. 
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4. Extraverts will be more likely to choose more socially-oriented strategies than 
introverts who will be more likely to use asocial strategies such as withdrawal.   
5. Neurotics will frequently use ineffective strategies such as ruminating, eating, and 
drinking alcohol to improve their mood states.  Emotionally stable individuals will 
more frequently use effective strategies such as cognitive reappraisal and distraction 
than neurotics. 
6. Individuals high in insight will use more effective strategies than those low in insight.  
Those high in self-reflection, but low in insight, will report the use of ineffective 
strategies. 
7. The use of strategies subsumed by the MARS indices active distraction, cognitive 
engagement, and behavioral engagement, will be associated with increased levels of 
PA and SWB.  Conversely, the use of strategies subsumed by the indices passive 
distraction and acceptance, rumination and withdrawal, and venting and expressing 
affect will be associated with higher levels of NA and lower levels of SWB.  Waiting 
and reframing will be unrelated to well being. 
 
Method 
Participants 
       Table 1 describes the participants by culture, gender, and age.  Four hundred and eighty-
nine students from three universities in three continents (140 men and 349 women), ranging 
in age from 17 to 65 (M = 22.57), participated in the present study.  In the United States, the 
210 participants (65 men and 146 women) were all undergraduate students in psychology at 
the University of California, Berkley Campus, who participated in the study in exchange for 
course credit.  The age of the American participants ranged from 18 to 34 (M = 19.91 years).  
In Norway, the 193 participants (54 men and 139 women) were psychology undergraduate 
students at the University of Oslo whose age ranged from 19 to 65 (M = 23.62).  The 
Norwegian students received no reward for participation in the study.  In Australia, of the 85 
participants recruited (21 men and 64 women), ranging in age from 17 to 50 (M = 26.75), 
almost 60% were undergraduate psychology students in psychology at Griffith University, 
Gold Coast Campus, who participated in the study in exchange for course credit.  
Approximately 35% of the participants were higher level psychology students from the same 
university who did not receive a reward for their participation, whilst the remaining 5% were 
undergraduate students who received a coffee voucher valued at US$2 in exchange for their 
participation. 
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Materials 
       Participants completed a questionnaire booklet.  In Norway, the questionnaire was 
distributed in Norwegian.  To ensure the meanings of the various scales were retained, the 
back-translation method was used to translate any scale that had not previously been 
translated from English into Norwegian.  This process involved native Norwegian speakers 
translating the English scales into Norwegian, and then having the scales translated back into 
English.  The original scales and the back-translated scales were then compared to reveal any 
inconsistencies.  If necessary, adjustments were made to the Norwegian scales in order to 
address these inconsistencies.   
 
Demographic Information 
       Age and gender were established through two items which asked the respondent to 
indicate their age and gender respectively, whilst culture was based upon which country the 
data was collected in: Norway, USA, or Australia  
 
Self-Report Measures 
       Affect specificity was assessed through constructed questions which asked the 
participants to indicate which one strategy they were most likely to use when experiencing a 
variety of different affective states, for example, when feeling bored, lonely, worried etc.  
Participants chose the particular strategy from a list of 13 broad groups of strategies.  These 
groupings were based on Larsen and Prizmic’s (2004) discussion of mood regulation 
strategies and can be found in Appendix 1.    
       The new 34 item Measure of Affect Regulation Styles (MARS; Larsen & Prizmic, 2004) 
was used to assess which affect regulation strategies were most frequently endorsed by 
participants.  Participants rated on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 6 (almost always) how 
frequently they generally used each of the given strategies to modify their feeling states.  
Example MARS items are “I take action to solve the problem causing my mood” and “I keep 
to myself, I want to be alone”.  As discussed, Larsen and Prizmic (2004) report that the 
MARS has seven factors: active distraction, cognitive engagement to manage the affect, 
behavioural engagement to mange the affect, venting and expressing the affect,  passive 
distraction and acceptance, rumination and withdrawal, and waiting and reframing.  As these 
are formative indices and a high degree of internal consistency is, therefore, not assumed, 
alpha coefficients were not calculated. 
                                                                                           Affect and person specificity 21
       To assess trait levels of extraversion and neuroticism, the extraversion and neuroticism 
sub-scales of The Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 1991) were used.  The BFI is a 
widely used measure of broad personality traits that has been demonstrated to have good 
convergent and divergent validity (John & Srivastava, 1991).  Each sub-scale contains eight 
items and participants rated the extent to which they agreed that each item was an apt 
descriptor of their own personality.  Higher numbers corresponded to higher levels of 
agreement.  Example items from the extraversion subscale include “I see myself as someone 
who is talkative” and “I see myself as someone who is outgoing, sociable”.  Example items 
from the neuroticism subscale include “I see myself as someone who is depressed, blue” and 
“I see myself as someone who can be moody”.  John and Srivastava (1991) report reliability 
coefficients of .88 and .84 for the extraversion and neuroticism subscales of the BFI 
respectively.  In the present study, coefficients were calculated to be .85 and .83. 
       Private self-consciousness was assessed using the newly developed Self Reflection and 
Insight Scale (SRIS; Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002).  This scale contains 20 items, ten of 
which measure self-reflection (SRIS-SR) and the other ten, insight (SRIS-IN).  Participants 
rated the extent to which they agreed with the statements on a scale from 1 to 6, with higher 
numbers corresponding to higher levels of agreement.  Example self-reflection items include 
“I frequently examine my feelings” and “It is important for me to evaluate the things that I 
do”.  Example insight items include “I usually have a clear idea about why I’ve behaved in a 
certain way” and “Often I find it difficult to make sense of the way I feel about things”.  
Although this is a new scale and has not been used extensively in research, it does appear to 
be a reliable instrument.  Grant, Franklin and Langford reported alpha coefficients of .91 and 
.87 for the self-reflection and insight scales respectively, whilst alpha coefficients of .91 and 
.77 were calculated in the present study. 
       The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) was 
used to assess depressive severity.  This scale does not assess clinical depression, but rather 
measures depressed mood.  The CES-D contains 20 items and participants indicated how 
often during the past week they had felt or have behaved in certain ways on a scale ranging 
from “0 - rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day)” to “3 - most or all of the time (5-7 
days)”.  Example items include “I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me” and I 
was happy”.  A total score is derived by summing the responses, with higher scores indicating 
a higher level of severity.  The CES-D has been studied extensively and has been found to be 
reliable (Radloff, 1991; Roberts & Vernon, 1983; Santor & Coyne, 1997) and valid (e.g. 
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Himmelfarb & Murrell, 1983).  The present study calculated an internal reliability coefficient 
of .89.      
       Affect was assessed using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson,Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  The PANAS is a 20 item scale which measures trait levels 
of positive affect and negative affect.  Participants rated the degree to which each of 20 
adjectives (10 positive and 10 negative) described them on average on a 5 point scale ranging 
from very slightly or not at all to extremely.  This is a well-established and reliable measure of 
affect (Watson et al, 1988).  Watson and colleagues (1988) report Cronbach alphas of .88 and 
.87 for positive and negative affect respectively.  In the present study, alphas of .84 and .85 
were calculated. 
       Subjective well-being was assessed using the brief, five item Satisfaction with Life Scale 
(SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985).  Participants rated the extent to which 
they agreed with the statements on a likert-type scale from 1 to 7 with higher numbers 
corresponding to higher levels of agreement.  Example items include “In most ways my life is 
close to my ideal” and “If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing”.  The 
psychometric properties of this scale have been repeatedly studied and it has been show to be 
a valid and reliable measure of well-being (Pavot & Diener, 1993; Diener et al., 1985).  Pavot 
and Diener report an alpha coefficient of .87 whilst, in the present study, an alpha of .86 was 
calculated. 
 
Procedure 
       Participants were asked to carefully read and to sign a consent form.  This consent form 
assured them of their right to withdraw from the study at any time and also of the 
confidentiality of their responses.  They were specifically instructed not to write their names 
anywhere on the questionnaire itself to ensure anonymity.  Having provided informed 
consent, the participants completed the questionnaire booklet.  The questionnaire took 25 
minutes on average to complete.  Consent forms and questionnaire booklets were stored 
separately to ensure the anonymity of the participants.  In Australia and the United States, it 
was necessary to apply to the Ethics Committees at both Griffith University and at the 
University of California prior to carrying out this study, however, no such permission was 
sought in Norway.   
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Results 
Affect specificity  
 
       Table 2 describes the one strategy (chosen from thirteen broad strategy groupings) that 
participants indicated was the strategy that they usually use when experiencing each of five 
negative mood states (lonely, sad, bored, worried, anxious, and sad).  Several clear tendencies 
were found.   Both genders reported that they most often employ distraction strategies when 
bored and tend to socialise when lonely.  When feeling worried, anxious, sad, and angry, 
participants reported that they most often use talking to improve their moods.  In several 
instances, however, women and men reported differential use of the same strategy.  
Specifically, when experiencing a sad mood , both women and men reported talking as their 
most frequently used strategy, however, a higher percentage of the females were found to do 
so than the males (χ2(1, N = 487) = 11.03, p > .001) .  A similar result was found for angry 
mood states (χ2(1, N = 486) = 10.20, p > .001).  In other instances, the most frequently used 
strategies by women and men were completely different.  Specifically, when feeling either 
worried or anxious, women reported talking as the most frequently used mood regulation 
strategy whilst men, in both cases, reported that they most frequently do something active in 
order to regulate their moods.     
 
Person Specificity  
Frequencies 
       As shown in Table 3, across the entire sample, the most frequently endorsed MARS 
indices were: Cognitive engagement (M = 3.77, SD = .98), Behavioural engagement (M = 
3.35, SD = .80), and Venting and expressing affect (M = 3.22, SD = .93).  The least frequently 
endorsed MARS index was: Passive distraction and acceptance (M = 2.17, SD = 1.08). 
       In terms of specific strategies, the most frequently endorsed mood regulation strategies, 
i.e. those strategies whose mean total scores were 4 (often) or more, were: I try to be grateful 
for the things in my life that are going well (M = 4.43, SD = 1.32), I try to understand my 
feelings by thinking and analysing them (M = 4.23, SD = 1.36), I try to put things into 
perspective (M = 4.07, SD = 1.16), and I talk to someone or my friend about my feelings (M = 
4.06, SD = 1.53).  The least frequently endorsed strategies, i.e. those strategies whose mean 
total scores were 2 (hardly ever) or less, were: I use alcohol (M = 1.09, SD = 1.29),  I talk to 
an advisor or mentor (M = 1.14, SD = 1.46), I pray, put my faith in God, or do something 
religious (M = 1.65, SD = 1.93).   
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Mood regulation strategies across gender and culture 
       The mean scores on the MARS indices were compared by gender (refer to Table 3).  
Significant differences were revealed between the males and females on five of the seven 
indices: active distraction, t (487) = 2.60, p < .01, venting and expressing affect, t(487) = 
6.63, p < .001, passive distraction and acceptance, t(487) = 3.75, p < .001, rumination and 
withdrawal, t(487) = 5.10, p < .001, and waiting and reframing, t(487) = 2.58, p < .01.  In 
each case, women were found to make significantly greater use of the mood regulation 
strategies subsumed by that index than men.   
       Strategy specific gender differences are also reported in Table 3.  Women were 
significantly more likely than men to use the following strategies to regulate their moods: I 
socialise, t(487) = 4.48, p < .001, I treat myself to something special, t(487) = 4.12, p < .001, I 
send text messages (SMS) to friends and family, t(487) = 4.82, p < .001, I let my feelings out 
by expressing them, t(487) = 6.40, p < .001, I talk to someone about my feelings, t(487) = 
7.66, < .001, I eat something, t(487) = 4.92, p < .001, and I write about my feelings in a diary, 
t(487) = 6.25, p < .001.  Conversely, men were found to make significantly greater use of the 
following strategies than women to regulate their moods: I try not to let my feelings show, to 
suppress any expression, t (487) = 2.98, p < .01, and I keep for myself, I want to be alone, 
t(487) = 3.17, p < .01.   
       The mean scores on the MARS indices were compared cross culturally (see Table 4).  
Significant differences were revealed between the three cultures on five of the seven indices: 
cognitive engagement to manage the affect, F(2,486) = 6.95, p < .001, venting and expressing 
affect, F(2,486) = 6.34, p < .01, passive distraction and acceptance, F(2,486) = 6.26, p < .01, 
rumination and withdrawal, F(2,486) = 27.42, p < .001, and waiting and reframing, F (2,486) 
= 23.72, p < .001.   
       Post hoc tests were conducted to uncover where the specific differences between cultures 
lay.  Hochberg testing revealed that Americans (M = 3.58, SD = 1.14) reported less use of the 
strategies subsumed by the index cognitive engagement to manage the affect than 
Norwegians, (M = 3.91, SD = .75), p < .01, or Australians, (M = 3.92, SD = .95), p < .05.   
       Australians (M = 3.51, SD = .86) reported greater use of the strategies subsumed by the 
index venting and expressing affect than Norwegians, (M = 3.18, SD = .85), p < .05, and 
Americans, (M = 3.13, SD = 1.01), p < .01.   
       It was found that Americans (M = 2.34, SD = 1.01) were more likely to use the strategies 
subsumed by the index passive distraction and acceptance than Norwegians, (M = 1.97, SD = 
1.11), p < .001.  Strategy specific post hoc tests further revealed that Norwegians (M = 1.62, 
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SD = 1.35) were significantly less likely to use the strategy I eat something to regulate their 
moods than Australians, (M = 2.40, SD = 1.63), p < .001, or Americans, (M = 2.59, SD = 
1.58), p < .001.  Additionally, Norwegians (M = 1.22, SD = 1.70) were less likely to employ 
the strategy I pray, put my faith in God, or do something religious than Australians, (M = 
1.87, SD = 2.07), p < .05, or Americans, (M = 1.96, SD = 2.00), p < .001.   
       Americans (M = 3.20, SD = .95) were revealed to make greater use of the strategies 
subsumed by the rumination and withdraw index than Norwegians, (M = 2.61, SD = .76), p < 
.001, and Australians, (M = 2.62, SD = .90), p < .001.           
 
Mood regulation strategies across personality traits 
       Correlations between personality traits and mood regulation strategies are reported in 
Table 5.  Extraversion correlated positively with the use of strategies involving venting and 
expressing, r = .37, p < .001, cognitive engagement, r = .29, p < .001, active distraction, r = 
.28, p < .001, behavioural engagement, r = .27, p < .001, and correlated negatively with the 
use of strategies involving rumination and withdrawal, r = -.14, p < .001. 
       Neuroticism correlated positively with rumination and withdrawal, r = .36, p < .001, 
passive distraction and acceptance, r = .19, p < .001, and waiting and reframing, r = .18, p < 
.001, and correlated negatively with the use of strategies involving cognitive engagement, r = 
-.29, p < .001. 
       Self-Reflection was significantly correlated with five of the seven MARS indices.  Of 
particular note were the positive correlations found between Self Reflection and Rumination 
and Withdrawal, r = .39, p < .001, and Waiting and Reframing, r = .23, p < .001. 
       Insight was significantly correlated with four of the seven MARS indices.  Whilst none of 
the correlations were particularly strong, the positive correlations between Insight and venting 
and expressing, r = .22, p< .001, and cognitive engagement, r = .19, p < .001, are noteworthy. 
       Multiple regression analyses were conducted in which extraversion, neuroticism, self-
reflection, and insight were used to predict scores on the various MARS indices.   
       The set of variables predicted 25% of the variance in the use of rumination and 
withdrawal strategies, R2 (4,480) = .25, p < .001.  Self-Reflection predicted unique variance in 
the use of rumination and withdrawal strategies (ß = .39, p < .001), as did Neuroticism (ß = 
.27, p < .001).   
       The set of variables predicted 18% of the variance in the use of venting and expressing 
affect strategies, R2 (4,480) = .18, p < .001 with Extraversion as the strongest predictor (ß = 
.38, p < .001), followed by Insight (ß = .15, p < .01). 
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        The set of variables predicted 17% of the variance in the use of cognitive engagement 
strategies, R2 (4,480) = .17, p < .001. In this case, Neuroticism predicted unique variance in 
the use of cognitive engagement strategies (ß = -.25, p < .001), as did Self-Reflection (ß = .21, 
p < .001), and Extraversion (ß = .19, p < .001). 
 
Mood regulation strategies and well being    
       Table 6 describes the correlations found between the seven MARS indices and each of 
the four well-being measures.  Active distraction was significantly and positively correlated 
with Positive Affect, r = .24, p < .001.  It was also positively and significantly correlated with 
Satisfaction with Life, r = .13, p < .01, however the correlation was much weaker.  Strategies 
involving cognitive engagement were positively correlated with Positive Affect, r = .39, p < 
.001, and Satisfaction with Life, r = .37, p < .001, and negatively correlated with Depressed 
Mood, r = -.18, p < .001, and Negative Affect, r = -.19, p < .001.  Behavioural engagement 
strategies were positively correlated with Positive Affect, r = .41, p < .001, and Satisfaction 
with Life, r = .24, p < .001.  Venting and expressing strategies were positively correlated with 
Satisfaction with Life, r = .27, p < .001 and Positive Affect, r = .23, p < .001, and negatively 
with Depressed Mood, r = -.21, p < .001. 
       Passive distraction and acceptance strategies were positively correlated with Depressed 
Mood, r = .24, p < .001, and Negative Affect, r = .22, p < .001.  Rumination and withdrawal 
strategies were also positively correlated with Depressed Mood, r = .38, p < .001, and 
Negative Affect, r = .30, p < .001.  Similarly, strategies involving waiting and reframing were 
positively correlated with Depressed Mood, r = .30, p < .001, and Negative Affect, r = .25, p 
< .001. 
       To explore whether the strength of the correlations between the mood regulation 
strategies and the well-being outcomes were different for males and females, the data was 
split by gender and the analyses were repeated.  Based on a visual inspection of the results, 
the correlation coefficients that were suspected of being significantly different for males and 
females were then further tested to uncover if any such differences were significant.  These 
analyses did not produce any significant results. 
 
A mediating effect? 
       The Sobel test is used to investigate whether a mediator variable carries the effect of an 
independent variable to a dependent variable (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).  To test whether 
strategy usage mediated the effect that extraversion and neuroticism (independent variables) 
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had upon the well-being measures (dependent variables), two summary measures were firstly 
constructed.  The first measure combined the scores of each of the effective strategy indices 
(cognitive engagement, behavioural engagement, venting and expressing) whilst the other 
combined the scores of each of the ineffective strategy indices (rumination and withdrawal, 
passive distraction and acceptance, and waiting and reframing).  These were the mediator 
variables.  Eight separate Sobel tests were conducted.  The first four tested whether the use of 
effective strategies mediated the effect of extraversion on each of the well-being measures and 
the second four tested whether the use of ineffective strategies mediated the effect of 
neuroticism on each of the well-being measures.  None of these analyses produced significant 
results, hence the affect regulation strategies did not mediate the effect of extraversion and 
neuroticism upon well-being. 
 
Discussion 
 
Affect specificity in strategy use 
       As no other studies had specifically explored the role of affect specificity in the use of 
mood regulation strategies, the hypothesis proposed in the present study was purposely broad 
and unspecific.  It was posited that individuals make differential use of mood regulation 
strategies depending upon the mood state experienced.  The hypothesis was partially 
confirmed by the empirical data.  For several affective states, a large percentage of 
participants reported a propensity to use a particular strategy type.  In the case of boredom 
(where distraction was the most frequently endorsed strategy), and in the case of loneliness 
(where socialising was the most frequently endorsed strategy), individuals reported choosing 
strategies which, based on the mood state experienced, have adaptive value.       
       It was not consistently found, however, that different affective states resulted in the use of 
different mood regulation strategies.  Participants reported talking as the strategy they would 
be most likely to use when feeling worried, anxious, sad, and angry which points to a 
potential ‘over-reliance’ on this strategy.  Whilst talking is possibly adaptive when 
experiencing certain mood states, it may be less adaptive when applied indiscriminately.  As 
previously discussed, Gondolf (1985) and Straus et al., (1980) have shown that talking about 
one’s angry feelings tends to strengthen and prolong those feelings as opposed to dampening 
them.  Larsen (1993) reported that expressing oneself when feeling sad was associated with 
heightened levels of sadness.  It is evident, however, that females show this tendency to rely 
on talking as a mood regulation strategy more so than males.  When the strategies were 
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analysed by gender, the most frequently used strategies by women and men were actually 
different when feeling either worried or anxious.  Here, in both cases, women reported talking 
as the most frequently used mood regulation strategy whilst men reported that they most 
frequently do something active in order to regulate their moods.  The results indicate, 
therefore, that men appear to have a more varied repertoire of strategies that they employ to 
regulate their moods than women. 
 
Gender, culture and strategy use 
       A particular goal of the present study was to produce a current assessment of the most 
frequently endorsed mood regulation strategies amongst men and women.   Based on previous 
research (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema & Corte, 2004; Raver, 1996; 
Thayer, et al., 1994; Tice & Baumeister, 1993), it was hypothesised that men and women 
would differentially use mood regulation strategies.  Of the seven indices of the MARS, 
women reported significantly greater use of the strategies subsumed by five of those indices 
than men: active distraction, venting and expressing, passive distraction and acceptance, 
rumination and withdrawal, and waiting and reframing.  It is difficult to draw conclusions 
about the reasoning for this.  Perhaps women make more frequent attempts to regulate their 
moods than men because they experience greater variation in their moods or perhaps they are 
more aware of their varying emotional states.  It may be that women, more so than men, feel 
that moods are something that can be controlled and, hence, consciously employ a greater 
variation of techniques in an attempt to remedy their negative mood states.  These 
explanations are purely speculative, of course, and should be the subject of future study.  Both 
genders did report, however, similar use of the two most effective strategy types – cognitive 
engagement and behavioural engagement. 
       With regards to the strategy specific differences between the genders, it was found that, 
in line with our hypothesis, women were more inclined to socialise, vent (talk, express 
themselves, and write in a diary), and to eat in order to regulate their moods than their male 
counterparts.  In addition to these confirmatory findings, it was also revealed that women tend 
to self-gift more than men to improve their mood states.   
       Our hypothesis suggesting that men would use make greater use of distraction strategies, 
such as exercising and alcohol consumption, than women in order to regulate their moods was 
not confirmed.  No significant differences were found between men and women’s reliance 
upon these specific strategies which contradicts prior research that has found this to be the 
case (Nolen-Hoeksema & Corte, 2004; Thayer et al., 1994; Tice & Baumeister, 1993).  It was 
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also revealed that men were more likely than women to suppress their feelings and to 
withdraw, which are most often maladaptive strategies to employ when one considers both the 
short and the long-term implications of using these strategies (Fichman, et al, 1999; Gross & 
John, 2003; Larsen, 2003). 
         A novel element of the present study was the investigation of any intra-individualistic 
cultural distinctions in the type and frequency of strategy usage.  Although there were no 
specific hypotheses regarding what actual differences would be found, it was assumed that 
cultural norms would exert some influence upon the type of strategies most frequently 
reported in the USA, Norway and Australia.   
       There were many significant differences found across the array of different strategies 
studied although most were subtle.  The most interesting differences found in the present 
study related to strategies subsumed by the ineffective strategy index: passive distraction and 
acceptance.  In terms of passive strategies, Americans and Australians were found to use 
prayer or other religious activity significantly more than Norwegians in order to alleviate a 
negative mood which is clearly related to cultural norms and values in these countries.  Also, 
Americans and Australians were also more likely to eat food to regulate their moods than 
Norwegians.  This is, of course, interesting when you consider that the USA and Australia 
rank numbers 10 and 22 respectively in the world in terms of their percentage of obese 
citizens (based on percentage of the population over 15 that have a BMI over 25).  Norway, 
however, does not appear until number 92 on the same list (World Health Organisation, 
2007).  Whilst there are clearly many factors that contribute to obesity levels in a particular 
country (including the proliferation of cheap and unhealthy fast-food alternatives), the regular 
use of eating as a strategy to deal with negative mood states will, in all likelihood, only 
contribute to the escalating weight problems faced by western society. 
 
Personality-based differences in strategy usage 
       Another proposition of the present study was that there are personality-based differences 
in the use of mood regulation states.   Whilst previous research has found that levels of 
extraversion and neuroticism clearly effect the frequency and type of mood experienced (see 
Watson, 2000, p.180-2, for a review of the research), the aim of the present study was to 
provide evidence to support the proposition that these personality traits also have an effect 
upon the strategies used to regulate an experienced mood.   
       Based on prior research in the personality field which has have described extraverts as 
gregarious and talkative (e.g. Matthews & Deary, 1998), it was assumed that individuals who 
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score high on extraversion would be likely to reveal a propensity towards the use of socially-
oriented strategies in order to regulate their moods.  This was found to be the case.  
Extraversion was positively correlated with strategies encompassed by the index venting and 
expressing affect, the MARS index most related to outside others.   
       Although not predicted, this study also revealed moderate positive correlations between 
extraversion and cognitive engagement strategies, behavioural engagement strategies, and the 
use of active distraction strategies.  Cognitive and behavioural engagement strategies, as 
discussed, have been found to be effective strategies to use to down-regulate a negative mood 
(Larsen, 1993, as cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 2004; Totterdell & Parkinson, 1999).  They 
require the individual to take action, either mentally or physically, to deal with their negative 
mood.  It can be speculated that extraverts have the ‘get up and go’ required to actively 
involve themselves in altering their own mood state.  Prior research has shown extraverts tend 
to be more energetic than introverts (Watson & Clark, 1992) and it is perhaps this elevated 
level of energy that means they are more willing or capable of taking the action required to 
alleviate a negative mood than introverts.  This is, of course, purely speculative. 
       The prediction that those who score low on extraversion (i.e. introverts) would be likely 
to rely on asocial strategies such as withdrawal was also supported by this study although the 
relationship was fairly weak.  
       Personality researchers have consistently found that individuals high in neuroticism tend 
to be anxious, and be easily stressed (Matthews & Deary, 1998).  Based on their generally 
negative disposition, it was proposed that individuals high in neuroticism would frequently 
make use of ineffective strategies to alter their mood states.  Such strategies could include 
ruminating and consumptive behaviours such as eating and drinking coffee.  Additionally, 
they would be less likely to employ more effective strategies such as distraction and cognitive 
reappraisal.  This was effectively confirmed by our study.  The more highly neurotic the 
individual, the less likely they were to utilise cognitive engagement strategies, and the more 
likely they were to ruminate and withdraw and to utilise passive distraction and acceptance 
strategies, such as eating, drinking etc.  Active distraction was found to be unrelated, 
however, to degree of neuroticism. 
       The two sub-components of private self-consciousness, self-reflection and insight, were 
presumed to differentially impact the use of mood regulation strategies.  Past research linking 
insight with positive well-being outcomes (Grant et al., 2002), prompted the hypothesis that a 
high level of insight would be a predictor in the proclivity to use effective mood regulation 
strategies.  This was not found to be the case in this study however.  Degree of insight was not 
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found to be associated with the use of the effective MARS strategy indices: cognitive 
engagement and behavioural engagement.  Venting and expressing affect was found in the 
present study to actually be associated with positive outcomes and this strategy type was, in 
fact, found to correlate significantly in a positive direction with insight. Still, based on the 
lack of association between insight and the other effective strategy types, it does not appear 
that the clarity of one’s understanding of an experienced mood state is particularly helpful in 
the choice of effective strategies. 
       It was found, conversely, that high scores on self-reflection were related to the use of 
ineffective strategies.  Self reflection was strongly and positively correlated with rumination 
and withdrawal and moderately correlated with waiting and reframing.  It appears, therefore, 
that being inspective and judgemental about one’s negative mood state does not facilitate the 
use of effective strategies to regulate that mood.  Conversely, self-reflection, appears to 
promote the use of passive, ineffective strategies.  This finding could possibly help to explain 
Grant and colleague’s (2002) findings that linked self-reflection with negative well-being 
outcomes such as anxiety and stress.  
 
A focus on subjective well-being 
       In contrast to previous studies in the field, the present study placed great emphasis upon 
SWB as the over-arching outcome variable of strategy usage.  This unique emphasis clearly 
separates this study from earlier research which has focused predominantly on the short-term 
effectiveness of the various affect regulation strategies (Larsen, 1993, as cited in Larsen & 
Prizmic, 2004; Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999; Prizmic, 2000 as cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 
2004; Thayer et al., 1994).   
       Interestingly, however, the findings in the present study were generally in line with those 
prior studies with a short-term focus.  It was found that cognitive and behavioural 
engagement strategies were related to positive well-being outcomes.  Passive distraction and 
acceptance, and rumination and withdrawal were related to negative well-being outcomes.  
Although it was not hypothesised, waiting and reframing strategies were also found to be 
related to negative well-being outcomes.   
       As discussed, the relative merits of using venting and expressing strategies to regulate 
one’s mood have been disputed by many academics (Baumeister et al., 1994; Gondolf, 1985; 
Larsen, 1993, as cited in Larsen & Prizmic, 2004; Straus et al., 1980) and it was, therefore, 
predicted that the use of these strategies would result in the up-regulation or prolongation of 
negative mood states.  The findings of present study, however, support the notion that venting 
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and expressing are positive strategies to utilise, both in the short and long term.  Such 
strategies were found to be negatively related to depressed mood, and positively related to 
positive affect and satisfaction with life.  This finding is in contrast to the majority of recent 
research in this area. 
       The present study found that active distraction was moderately and positively associated 
with PA, however, its relationship to SWL was rather weak.  This finding indicates that whilst 
active distraction strategies may prove to be useful for the short-term down-regulation of 
negative mood states, the long term benefits of relying on these types of strategies for mood 
regulation are less positive.  Strategies such as cognitive engagement, behavioural 
engagement, and venting and expressing certainly appear, from the results of the present 
study, to have stronger associations with SWB.      
   A final important finding of this study was that affect regulation strategies did not 
mediate the effect of extraversion and neuroticism upon subjective well-being.  This means 
that the strategies have a unique effect on SWB, independent of the effects of extraversion 
and neuroticism. This is an important finding when one considers the potential for changing 
maladaptive emotion regulation strategies through, for example, intervention programs. 
 
 Limitations of the study 
       A limitation of the present study is that it is a purely descriptive study and causation, 
therefore, cannot be established.  The data collected only tells us that there is a relationship 
between the various individual differences variables and the mood regulation strategies used 
and between the strategies used and subjective well-being.  The underlying causal 
mechanisms, however, are not explained.   
       For example, two models can potentially explain the observed relationships.  It can be 
argued that personality variables affect the type of strategy used to regulate a mood state 
which, in turn, has a long term effect on well-being.  Alternatively, it could be argued that the 
personality variables directly affect well-being and it is one’s well-being that determines the 
type of strategy used to regulate one’s mood.   Both models described fit the data and could 
reasonably explain the relationship between these variables.  Uncovering just which model 
correctly describes these mechanisms must be the subject of future research.   
       Anther limitation of this study was the inclusion of three individualistic cultures and the 
absence of a collectivist culture.  Given the similarity of the cultures in American, Australia 
and Norway, it is perhaps not surprising that few overt differences in strategy usage were 
found.  Future research in the field should focus additionally on collectivist cultures if more 
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substantive cultural differences are to be revealed.  Additionally, because the participants 
were all university students of psychology, it would not be appropriate to indiscriminately 
generalise the results to the general population. 
 
Conclusion 
       The present study was concerned principally with investigating the issues of affect and 
person specificity in the use of mood regulation strategies, and the exploration of the 
relationship between strategy usage and subjective well-being.  The key findings of the study 
were: (i) For certain affective states, individuals show a tendency to use the same adaptive 
strategy to improve their moods.  This was not found for all affective states however.  
Females revealed a tendency to utilise venting and expressing strategies, seemingly somewhat 
regardless of the mood state experienced, whilst men often tried to distract themselves from 
their moods;  (ii) There are a variety of individual differences variables that appear to affect 
which strategies are used to regulate one’s mood, albeit in a variety of different ways and to 
different degrees.  These variables include gender, culture, and degree of extraversion, 
neuroticism, self-reflection and insight;  (iii) Higher levels of subjective well-being are linked 
to the use of cognitive and behavioural engagement and venting and expressing strategies.  
The present study has made a unique contribution to the field by providing an extensive 
mapping of an area of mood regulation theory that has previously been neglected by research 
and raises many important questions to be addressed by future studies in the field. 
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Appendix 1  
13 broad groupings of strategy types (with examples) used in the study of affect specificity. 
1.   Distraction:  I try to think of other things, or try to do something to distract myself (for  
      example, watch TV, read a book, work). 
2.   Talking:  I express my feelings by, for example, talking to someone about them. 
3.   Suppression:  I try not to show my feelings. 
4.   Reinterpretation:  I try to reinterpret the situation to find a new meaning, or I try to 
find something good in the situation. 
5.   Social comparison:  I compare myself with people who are worse off than I am. 
6.   Doing something active:  I take action to solve the problem, or I make plans to avoid  
 such problems in the future. 
7.   Reward:  I treat myself to something special, or something I really like. 
8.   Exercise/consumption:  I exercise, eat, drink, or sleep to get rid of my bad mood. 
9.   Socialising:  I socialise with friends or family in order to forget my bad mood. 
10. Withdrawal:  I want to be alone.  I withdraw from or avoid the situation. 
11. Grateful:  I try to be grateful for the good things in my life. 
12. Helping others:  I do what I can to help others. 
13.   Laugh/joke:  I laugh, joke, or try to make myself or others laugh. 
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Table 1 
Descriptives of study participants. 
 
 Total N Men Women < 25 years =/> 25 years 
Total sample 489 140 349 399 85 
Norway 193 54 139 147 46 
United States 211 65 146 206 4 
Australia 85 21 64 50 35 
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Table 2 
Most frequently used mood regulation strategy based on mood state experienced (percentage of total in parenthesis). 
 Most frequently reported strategy type 
Mood state experienced N Females Males 
Bored Distraction (63.8) Distraction (64.5) Distraction (62.1) 
Lonely Socialising (49.5) Socialising (52.7) Socialising (42.4) 
Worried Talking (35.4) Talking (43.7) Doing something active (29.3) 
Anxious Talking (28.6) Talking (34.9) Doing something active (17.1) 
Sad Talking (29.2) Talking (33.7) Talking (18.6) 
Angry Talking (40.5)  Talking (45.2) Talking (29.5) 
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Table 3  
Summary and comparison of means (standard deviations in parentheses) of MARS indices and items by gender. 
MARS items (grouped by index)  Total Sample Female Male t 
Active distraction 
     I socialise. 
     I do something fun, something I really enjoy. 
     I watch TV, read a book, listen to music. 
     I use alcohol. 
     I laugh, joke around, try to make myself or others laugh. 
     I treat myself to something special. 
     I play sports, exercise. 
     I think about something to distract myself from my feelings. 
Cognitive engagement to manage the affect 
     I try to think about those things that are going well for me. 
     I try to be grateful for the things in my life that are going well. 
     I try to put things into perspective. 
2.94 (.80) 
3.22 (1.53) 
3.86 (1.31) 
3.42 (1.44) 
1.09 (1.29) 
3.54 (1.50) 
2.99 (1.30) 
3.17 (1.63) 
3.22 (1.28) 
3.77 (.98) 
3.99 (1.32) 
4.43 (1.32) 
4.07 (1.16) 
3.00 (.79) 
3.41 (1.50) 
3.90 (1.27) 
3.51 (1.41) 
1.03 (1.21) 
3.48 (1.51) 
3.14 (1.23) 
3.10 (1.59) 
3.30 (1.23) 
3.77 (.97) 
4.01 (1.25) 
4.46 (1.30) 
4.05 (1.12) 
2.79 (.81) 
2.74 (1.52) 
3.76 (1.41) 
3.21 (1.52) 
1.24 (1.45) 
3.71 (1.49) 
2.61 (1.39) 
3.35 (1.73) 
3.02 (1.37) 
3.77 (1.02) 
3.94 (1.47) 
4.36 (1.37) 
4.14 (1.25) 
2.60* 
4.48** 
1.03 
2.04 
-1.64 
-1.59 
4.12** 
-1.52 
2.21 
.03 
.60 
.71 
-.75 
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 Cognitive engagement to manage the affect (cont.)   
    I try to find something good in the situation. 
     I compare myself to people who are worse off. 
Behavioural engagement to manage the affect 
     I make plans or resolution to avoid such problems in future. 
     I work on something or stay busy. 
     I take action to solve the problem. 
     I go out of my way to help someone. 
Venting and  expressing affect 
     I let my feelings out by expressing them. 
     I try to not let my feeling show, to suppress any expression (rev). 
     I talk to someone or my friend about my feelings. 
     I keep for myself, I want to be alone (rev). 
     I talk to an advisor or mentor. 
 Passive distraction and acceptance 
     I pray, put my faith in God, or do something religious. 
 
3.69 (1.30) 
2.68 (1.43) 
3.35 (.80) 
3.73 (1.30) 
3.05 (1.29) 
3.87 (1.18) 
2.98 (1.44) 
3.22 (.93) 
3.56 (1.42) 
3.77 (1.33) 
4.06 (1.53) 
3.56 (1.34) 
1.14 (1.46) 
2.17 (1.08) 
1.65 (1.93) 
 
3.68 (1.28) 
2.66 (1.41) 
3.36 (.78) 
3.70 (1.24) 
3.15 (1.26) 
3.81 (1.18) 
3.02 (1.45) 
3.39 (.92) 
3.81 (1.37) 
3.88 (1.34) 
4.37 (1.40) 
3.68 (1.30) 
1.18 (1.48) 
2.28 (1.09) 
1.70 (1.95) 
 
3.71 (1.36) 
2.71 (1.50) 
3.32 (.84) 
3.78 (1.42) 
2.81 (1.35) 
4.01 (1.16) 
2.88 (1.41) 
2.79 (.82) 
2.94 (1.37) 
3.49 (1.26) 
3.26 (1.55) 
3.26 (1.39) 
1.01 (1.40) 
1.89 (.97) 
1.53 (1.88) 
 
-.22 
-.30 
.51 
-.63 
2.66* 
-1.73  
1.00 
6.63** 
6.40** 
2.98* 
7.66** 
3.17* 
1.16 
3.75** 
.89 
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Passive distraction and acceptance (cont.)      
     I try to accept it as my fate, what will be will be. 
     I drink coffee or caffeinated beverages. 
     I eat something. 
Rumination and withdrawal 
     I write about my feeling in diary. 
     I withdraw from or avoid the situation. 
     I sleep or take a nap. 
     I try to understand my feelings by thinking and analysing them. 
Waiting and reframing 
     I try to reinterpret the situation, to find different meaning. 
     I daydream of the time when I will not have this problem. 
 
2.61 (1.62) 
2.17 (1.93) 
2.17 (1.57) 
2.87 (.92) 
1.99 (1.87) 
2.53 (1.29) 
2.73 (1.60) 
4.23 (1.36) 
2.79 (1.06) 
3.39 (1.39) 
2.84 (1.77) 
 
2.68 (1.56) 
2.27 (1.94) 
2.39 (1.56) 
3.00 (.89) 
2.31 (1.86) 
2.58 (1.29) 
2.79 (1.53) 
4.31 (1.32) 
2.86 (1.06) 
3.42 (1.37) 
2.97 (1.76) 
 
2.44 (1.76) 
1.94 (1.90) 
1.64 (1.45) 
2.54 (.92) 
1.19 (1.56) 
 2.39 (1.25) 
2.58 (1.76) 
4.02 (1.44) 
2.59 (1.03) 
3.31 (1.45) 
2.49 (1.76) 
 
1.47 
1.73 
4.92** 
5.10** 
6.25** 
1.56 
1.30 
2.15 
2.58* 
.83 
2.73* 
Note. MARS = Measure of Affect Regulation Styles.   
* p < .01. ** p <.001. 
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Table 4  
Summary and comparison of means (standard deviation in parentheses) for MARS indices and items by culture. 
MARS items (grouped by index)  Norway Australia USA F Sig. contrasts 
Active distraction 
     I socialise. 
     I do something fun, something I really enjoy. 
     I watch TV, read a book, listen to music. 
     I use alcohol. 
     I laugh, joke around, try to make myself or others laugh. 
     I treat myself to something special. 
     I play sports, exercise. 
     I think about something to distract myself from my feelings. 
     Cognitive engagement to mange the affect 
     I try to think about those things that are going well for me. 
     I try to be grateful for the things in my life that are going well. 
     I try to put things into perspective. 
2.98 (.70) 
3.48 (1.42) 
3.69 (1.20) 
3.32 (1.34) 
1.20 (1.20) 
3.52 (1.40) 
2.95 (1.16) 
3.29 (1.46) 
3.35 (1.11) 
3.91 (.75) 
4.25 (1.04) 
4.67 (1.07) 
4.00 (1.08) 
2.92 (.93) 
2.94 (1.61) 
3.91 (1.43) 
3.27 (1.50) 
1.25 (1.40) 
3.68 (1.53) 
3.13 (1.35) 
3.18 (1.71) 
3.14 (1.26) 
3.92 (.95) 
4.18 (1.25) 
4.44 (1.38) 
4.34 (1.03) 
2.91 (.83) 
3.09 (1.57) 
4.00 (1.35) 
3.59 (1.50) 
.91 (1.30) 
3.51 (1.59) 
2.97 (1.40) 
3.07 (1.74) 
3.14 (1.42) 
3.58 (1.14) 
3.68 (1.50) 
4.21 (1.50) 
4.03 (1.27) 
.43  
5.13* 
2.92 
2.31 
3.36  
.44 
.60 
.87 
1.66 
6.95** 
11.08** 
6.14* 
2.81 
 
1,2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2,3 
2,3 
2 
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Cognitive engagement to manage the affect (cont.)     
     I try to find something good in the situation. 
     I compare myself to people who are worse off. 
Behavioural engagement to manage the affect 
     I make plans or resolution to avoid such problems in future. 
     I work on something or stay busy. 
     I take action to solve the problem. 
     I go out of my way to help someone. 
Venting and  expressing affect 
     I let my feelings out by expressing them. 
     I try to not let my feeling show, to suppress any expression (R). 
     I talk to someone or my friend about my feelings. 
     I keep for myself, I want to be alone (R). 
     I talk to an advisor or mentor. 
 Passive distraction and acceptance 
     I pray, put my faith in God, or do something religious. 
 
3.81 (1.06) 
2.82 (1.24) 
3.35 (.70) 
3.50 (1.27) 
2.85 (1.25) 
3.75 (1.11) 
3.31 (1.26) 
3.18 (.85) 
3.60 (1.35) 
3.87 (1.22) 
4.07 (1.43) 
3.55 (1.31) 
.79 (1.24) 
1.97 (1.11) 
1.22 (1.70) 
 
3.76 (1.32) 
2.89 (1.58) 
3.47 (.78) 
4.07 (1.13) 
3.16 (1.29) 
4.13 (1.09) 
2.86 (1.43) 
3.51 (.86) 
3.54 (1.38) 
3.93 (1.42) 
4.21 (1.54) 
3.81 (1.27) 
2.06 (1.67) 
2.21 (1.07) 
1.87 (2.07) 
 
3.54 (1.47) 
2.46 (1.51) 
3.30 (.87) 
3.79 (1.34) 
3.19 (1.32) 
3.87 (1.26) 
2.73 (1.55) 
3.13 (1.01) 
3.54 (1.52) 
3.61 (1.38) 
3.98 (1.62) 
3.46 (1.39) 
1.08 (1.40) 
2.34 (1.01) 
1.96 (2.00) 
 
2.43 
4.38* 
1.38 
6.34*  
3.92 
3.06 
8.55** 
5.38* 
.09 
2.77 
.70 
2.15 
24.76** 
6.26* 
8.35** 
 
 
2 
 
1 
 
 
1,2 
1,3 
 
 
 
 
1,3 
2 
1,2 
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Passive distraction and acceptance (cont.)      
     I try to accept it as my fate, what will be will be. 
     I drink coffee or caffeinated beverages. 
     I eat something. 
Rumination and withdrawal 
     I write about my feeling in diary. 
     I withdraw from or avoid the situation. 
     I sleep or take a nap. 
     I try to understand my feelings by thinking and analysing them. 
Waiting and reframing 
     I try to reinterpret the situation, to find different meaning. 
     I daydream of the time when I will not have this problem. 
 
2.52 (1.43) 
2.34 (1.80) 
1.62 (1.35) 
2.61 (.76) 
1.60 (1.73) 
2.45 (1.15) 
2.31 (1.34) 
4.08 (1.32) 
3.16 (1.14) 
3.34 (1.25) 
2.97 (1.71) 
 
2.64 (1.77) 
1.94 (1.92) 
2.40 (1.63) 
2.62 (.90) 
1.72 (1.72) 
2.33 (1.26) 
2.13 (1.54) 
4.29 (1.32) 
2.34 (.89) 
3.56 (1.59) 
2.46 (1.75) 
 
2.69 (1.74) 
2.11 (2.05) 
2.59 (1.58) 
3.20 (.95) 
2.45 (1.95) 
2.68 (1.39) 
3.35 (1.64) 
4.34 (1.40) 
2.63 (.93) 
3.36 (1.44) 
2.87 (1.83) 
 
.59 
1.45 
22.39** 
27.42** 
12.03** 
2.85 
31.63** 
2.02 
23.72** 
.77 
2.51 
 
 
 
1,2 
2,3 
2,3 
 
2,3 
 
1,2 
 
 
Note. MARS = Measure of Affect Regulation Styles.   
*  p < .01. ** p <.001. 
1Significant difference found between Norway and Australia 
2Significant difference found between Norway and USA 
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3Significant difference found between Australia and USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                           Affect and person specificity 49
Table 5 
Bivariate correlations (Pearson’s) amongst individual differences variables and MARS 
indices. 
 Individual Differences Variables 
MARS Indices Extraversion Neuroticism Self-Reflection Insight 
Active distraction .28** -.07 .00 -.06 
Cognitive engagement .29** -.29** .18** .16** 
Behavioural engagement .27** -.08 .18** .10* 
Venting and expressing affect .37** .-05 .16** .21** 
Passive distraction and acceptance .05 .19** .09 -.13* 
Rumination and withdraw -.14** .36** .40** -.14* 
Waiting and reframing -.08 .18** .24** -.19** 
Note. MARS = Measure of Affect Regulation Styles. 
* p <.01. ** p <.001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                           Affect and person specificity 50
Table 6  
Bivariate correlations (Pearson’s) amongst measures of well-being and MARS indices. 
 
MARS Indices 
Depressed 
Mood 
Negative 
Affect 
Positive 
Affect 
Satisfaction 
With Life 
Active distraction .07 .05 .24** .13* 
Cognitive engagement -.18** -.19** .39** .37** 
Behavioural engagement -.03 .00 .41** .24** 
Venting and expressing affect -.21** -.07 .23** .27** 
Passive distraction and acceptance .24** .22** -.04 -.04 
Rumination and withdrawal .38** .30** -.10 -.14* 
Waiting and reframing .30** .25** .05 -.15** 
Note. MARS = Measure of Affect Regulation Styles. 
* p <.01. ** p <.001.  
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Figure 1  
Variables under investigation in the study of person specificity in mood regulation. 
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